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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the criminal justice system increasingly relies upon expert evidence, 
including scientific or pseudo-scientific evidence, the contingent and 
evolutionary nature of scientific knowledge poses growing challenges to the 
fair administration of justice.  Professor Edward Imwinkelried’s thoughtful 
contribution to this symposium in part grapples with those challenges.1  We 
fear, however, that, in addressing some of those problems, Professor 
Imwinkelried has painted too broadly, and has failed to acknowledge or 
address nuances that are very real and indeed common in so-called “shifted 
science” cases,2 and that require a different calculus than he applies. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. 
† John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 1  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State 
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated 
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018).   
 2  “Shifted science” refers to situations in which new scientific studies undermine the 
consensus that once existed in regard to particular knowledge claims, which claims are 
sometimes (but not always) based on science-derived evidence to begin with.  See Caitlin M. 
Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. 
& CIV. LIB. 259 (2012); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited: 
Percolation Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483 (2016); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Criminal Procedure 
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In order to set up our criticisms in context, we must summarize 
Professor Imwinkelried’s position more broadly.  As he explains in detail at 
the outset, the article concentrates on a single variable in a multi-variable 
analysis that is required under the law to determine if new scientific 
knowledge warrants giving post-conviction relief to a person whose original 
trial included the now-challenged expert results.  That single issue is whether 
the results of new research sufficiently undermine the testimony given at trial 
to justify relief if the other variables in the applicable legal test are satisfied.  
He begins this part of the analysis by two extreme examples to anchor the 
two ends of a continuum.  The first assumes that new research exists, but that 
it actually supports or does not contradict the main thrust of the testimony at 
issue, and this obviously would not qualify as undermining the trial 
testimony even though there were relevant post-trial research results.3  The 
second hypothesizes post-trial research that “thoroughly discredits the 
validity of the earlier testimony.”4  This circumstance would justify giving 
post-conviction relief, again assuming the other parts of the applicable test 
were met.  Finally, in discussing situations where the research arguably 
creates a basis to doubt the trial testimony falling short of his notion of 
“thoroughly discrediting” the trial testimony, Professor Imwinkelried begins 
his analysis as follows: “Suppose that after a criminal trial at which the 
prosecution relied on expert testimony, later scientific research raises a 
question about the validity of the testimony.  Standing alone, that should not 
lead to a new trial.”5 
In its most elemental sense, Professor Imwinkelried’s point might often 
be correct, at least when limited in the sense that he himself limits it.  He 
expands on his point in this way: “Assume that after a criminal trial at which 
the prosecution relied on expert testimony, later scientific research raises a 
question about the validity of the testimony.  Standing alone, that should not 
lead to a new trial.”6  He later contrasts such situations from situations where 
 
vs. Scientific Progress: The Challenging Path to Post-Conviction Relief in Cases That Arise 
During Periods of Shifts in Science, 41 VT. L. REV. 279 (2016).   
 3  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1107.  He illustrates this with a DNA example—that 
the development of the STR technique for analyzing DNA did not call into question the 
accuracy of the results of previously testified to single locus probe RFLP DNA results.   
 4  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1108.  He illustrates this with another DNA example—
that results from the single locus probe RFLP process that contradicted previously testified to 
results of the earlier multi-locus probe technique were simply more accurate than the previous 
results.  NOTE—it is not the results of the single locus probe that directly contradict the 
previous testimony exactly, but the realization that the multi-locus probe technique potentially 
had much greater potential dependency between alleles and made the product rule of 
questionable application.  The single locus probe results merely confirmed that overvaluation 
in the individual case when it generated a random match probability greater than that testified 
to in the previous case that used the product rule on multi-locus probe results. 
 5  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, text at 1109 n.60.   
 6  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1109.  
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the later research “seriously undermines” the trial testimony.  So, his main 
division of intermediate cases where new research does not “thoroughly 
discredit” the trial testimony is between those where new research merely 
“raises a question” about the trial testimony, and those which “seriously 
undermine” the trial testimony.7 
Putting aside any reservations about whether this binary classification 
can appropriately handle the myriad types of expertise involved in trial 
testimony and the myriad ways that new research can bear on it, our main 
objection is to the use of the controversy over Shaken Baby Syndrome as an 
example of subsequent research which “merely raises a question” about the 
propriety of trial testimony. 
Professor Imwinkelried elaborates: 
 
Suppose that after the trial, a single new scientific study reaches 
an outcome at odds with the validity of the expert technique relied 
on at trial. The subsequent research may render the prior testimony 
debatable but, at this point, the testimony has hardly been 
debunked. The outcome in the new research could easily be an 
artifact.8 
 
However, we believe that Professor Imwinkelried goes astray when he 
uses the current debates raging about the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) 
(now more frequently and expansively called “Abusive Head Trauma” 
(AHT)), to illustrate this point. 
We believe that Professor Imwinkelried overlooks the true nature of the 
medical-scientific debates in SBS/AHT cases; the import of the expert 
evidence in such cases; the various legal issues that can arise related to the 
expert testimony in such cases; and ultimately, therefore, the significance of 
newly recognized controversies in the medico-legal hypotheses underlying 
expert testimony in such cases.  We examine each of these concerns in turn. 
II. THE MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DEBATES ABOUT SBS/AHT 
Given the case that Professor Imwinkelried initially posits—one in 
which ample scientific research supports the expert testimony of prosecution 
witnesses at trial, and, after conviction, the defense comes up with “a single 
new scientific study” that contradicts it (or even several such studies)—such 
a case ordinarily would not lead one to conclude safely that the state’s 
hypothesis has been debunked, or perhaps even undermined sufficiently to 
warrant a new trial.  But that does not describe the nature of either the 
 
 7  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1106, 1109. 
 8  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1109.  
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underlying science or the new research in the SBS/AHT debates (or, for that 
matter, the standards for obtaining a new trial). 
To begin, the convictions in such cases, when they rest on the SBS/
AHT hypothesis, rest upon a thin reed indeed and not a well-researched and 
validated scientific principle.  The SBS hypothesis was first developed in the 
1970s as a way to try to understand what was happening when babies 
presented with serious brain injuries but no external signs of trauma.9  But 
because it is ethically impossible to conduct randomized controlled studies 
involving shaking and other abuse of children, it has been exceedingly 
difficult to conduct high-quality scientific studies to validate or invalidate 
the hypothesis.  As a consequence, the hypothesis remains largely 
unvalidated, devoid of a solid evidence base to establish either that shaking 
alone can cause such injuries, or that shaking alone or combined with an 
impact can be “diagnosed” reliably on the basis of the medical findings often 
used to form the expert opinions in these cases.10  Indeed, as Dr. Norman 
Guthkelch, one of the “fathers” of the SBS hypothesis, wrote, some 40+ 
years after he first proposed the hypothesis, he initially floated the idea as a 
hypothesis, and only a hypothesis, and it remains just that—an unproven 
hypothesis still in search of scientific support.11  The fundamental premise 
underlying Professor Imwinkelried’s hypothetical therefore does not 
describe the real world of SBS/AHT cases. 
Many proponents of the hypothesis adamantly insist, especially when 
responding to defense challenges to the expert testimony, that the hypothesis 
is well supported by volumes of research.12  And indeed there are volumes 
of papers devoted to trying to understand such brain injuries in infants and 
young children, and in particular attempting to support both the SBS 
hypothesis and the diagnostic criteria for SBS/AHT.  But none of that 
research achieves high quality-of-evidence ratings under evidence-based 
 
 9  See Arthur N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and its Relationship to 
Whiplash Injuries, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 430 (1971); John Caffee, The Whiplash Shaken Infant 
Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the Extremities with Whiplash-Induced Intraocular Bleedings, 
Linked with Residual Permanent Brain Damage and Mental Retardation, 54 PEDIATRICS 396 
(1974).   
 10  See Keith A. Findley, Patrick D. Barnes, David A. Moran & Waney Squier, Shaken 
Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 263–67 (2012).   
 11  Arthur N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant-Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with Minimal 
External Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 207 (2012) (“SBS and AHT are 
hypotheses that have been advanced to explain findings that are not yet fully understood.  
There is nothing wrong in advancing such hypotheses; this is how medicine and science 
progress.  It is wrong, however, to fail to advise parents and courts when these are simply 
hypotheses, not proven medical or scientific facts, or to attack those who point out problems 
with these hypotheses or who advance alternatives.”).   
 12  See, e.g., Sandeep K. Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken 
Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505 (2011), and literature cited therein.  
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medicine standards, for the reasons outlined above.  Most of the research is 
of necessity retrospective in nature; it involves examining cases in which 
children have suffered severe brain injury or death, dividing them into 
“abuse” or “non-abuse” categories, and then looking to see what conclusions 
can be drawn from, and what diagnostic features are presented in, each 
category.  But because there is no gold standard for distinguishing abuse 
from non-abuse, the research tends to rely for sorting on the very diagnostic 
features being studied (typically subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhages, 
cerebral edema, or a smattering of other findings)—thereby building in a 
circularity confound.  Virtually all of the research in the field—including 
that purporting to support the SBS/AHT hypothesis—recognizes this 
inherent circularity challenge.13 
Where attempts have been made to evaluate the evidence base under 
evidence-based-medicine standards, the evidence base has invariably come 
up wanting.14  Most recently, the Swedish Agency for Health Technology 
Assessment and Assessment of Social Services (SBU) undertook an 
exhaustive review of the literature in the field and concluded that “[t]here is 
limited scientific evidence” to support the claim that the traditional 
diagnostic “triad” or “its components can be associated with traumatic 
shaking (very low quality evidence)” and that “[t]here is insufficient 
scientific evidence on which to assess the diagnostic accuracy of the triad in 
identifying traumatic shaking (very low quality evidence).”15  The SBU 
 
 13  See, e.g., S. A. Maguire et al., Estimating the Probability of Abusive Head Trauma: A 
Pooled Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS 550, 558 (2011) (“Diagnostic studies in this field are open 
to criticism of circularity because of their dependence on a constellation of clinical features, 
as opposed to a single gold-standard diagnostic test, which does not exist.”); Shalea J. Piteau 
et al., Clinical and Radiographic Characteristics Associated with Abusive and Nonabusive 
Head Trauma: A Systematic Review, 130 PEDIATRICS 315, 321 (2012) (“As there are no 
standardized criteria for the definition of abuse, most authors developed their own criteria and 
many of these are fraught with circular reasoning.”); Narang, supra note 12, at 560–62 (while 
defending the research on SBS/AHT, acknowledging that “some circularity is inevitable, 
because we are unwilling to experimentally shake infants, and even reliably confessed 
accounts have some doubts”).   
 14  See, e.g., Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 24 
AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 239, 239 (2003).  Dr. Donohoe’s paper has been 
criticized by SBS-hypothesis proponents, who claim that the search terms he used for his 
literature review were not expansive enough.  See, e.g., Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian 
Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There is No Abusive Head 
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Scientific Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357, 1390–96 
(2013); Narang, supra note 12, at 535.  But those critics have never identified any papers that 
Dr. Donohoe’s search omitted that would have changed his assessment—that the evidence 
base is very weak—in any way.  Nor have they identified any errors in his application of 
evidence-based-medicine standards to the research, other than to assert that, because 
SBS/AHT research can never employ randomized controlled studies, that inherent weakness 
should not be held against the research base.  Narang, supra note 12, at 535. 
 15  Niels Lynøe, Göran Elinder, Boubou Hallberg, Måns Rosén, Pia Maly Sundgren & 
Anders Eriksson, Insufficient Evidence for “Shaken Baby Syndrome”—A Systematic Review, 
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elaborated: 
 
Although relatively many studies met the criteria for inclusion [in 
this literature review], the literature search identified only two 
studies of moderate quality. This is disconcerting, because 
traumatic shaking is very serious and has dramatic consequences 
for both the child and its family. The research field is complex, 
but this does not excuse, for example, circular reasoning and 
inadequate presentation of data collection. It is important that 
reviews of the field include consideration of the methodological 
flaws which characterise this field of research.16 
 
In this country, while no comparable governmental inquiry has yet been 
conducted into the scientific status of the SBS hypothesis, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), in its 2016 
groundbreaking report on other forensic sciences, observed “that there are 
issues related to the scientific validity of other types of forensic evidence that 
are beyond the scope of this report but require urgent attention—including 
notably . . . abusive head trauma commonly referred to as ‘Shaken Baby 
Syndrome.’”17 
Indeed, even many of the SBS-hypothesis’s strongest advocates, in 
their more candid moments, have acknowledged that the mechanism of 
injury in these cases is poorly understood, and that the scientific foundation 
is not solid.18  In 2009, for example, the American Academy of Pediatrics—
which as an organization consistently and vehemently defends the SBS/
AHT hypothesis—revised its official position paper, backing off of some of 
the certainty about the “diagnosis” that it had expressed in earlier iterations,19 
observing that “[f]ew pediatric diagnoses engender as much debate as AHT,” 
and that “many clinicians and researchers acknowledge that precise 
 
106 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 1021 (2017).   
 16  Id. at 1027.   
 17  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 23 n.15 (2016) (emphasis added).   
 18  See, e.g., Mark Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS, 
TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE 364 (2011) (‘‘Unfortunately, nobody has yet marshalled a 
coherent and comprehensive argument in support of shaking as a causal mechanism for 
abusive head injury.’’); M. Vaughn Emerson et al., Ocular Autopsy and Histopathologic 
Features of Child Abuse, 114 AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY 1384, 1394 (2007); Cindy W. 
Christian et al., Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1410 
(2009), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/123/5/1409.full.pdf. Critics of 
the SBS hypothesis also make the point.  See, e.g., Waney Squier, The “Shaken Baby” 
Syndrome: Pathology and Mechanisms, 122 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519, 521 (2011).   
 19  For a discussion of the changes in the position papers, see Findley et al., supra note 
10, at 240–42.  
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mechanisms for all abusive injuries remain incompletely understood.”20  In 
a leading child abuse textbook, Dr. Mark Dias, another prominent proponent 
of the hypothesis, similarly acknowledged the thinness of the science in a 
chapter meant to provide the definitive argument in support of the 
hypothesis.  In that chapter, entitled, “The Case for Shaking,” after 
acknowledging the lack of scientific evidence for the hypothesis, Dr. Dias 
concluded that “confessed shaking . . . is the evidentiary basis for shaking.”21 
Given all this, and after hearing extensive testimony from experts on 
both sides of the debates in federal habeas corpus proceedings, federal 
District Court Judge Matthew Kennelly found Jennifer Del Prete to be 
innocent of the SBS crime for which she had been convicted.22  In so ruling, 
Judge Kennelly found, in part, that the extensive scientific evidence 
presented to him “arguably suggests that a claim of shaken baby syndrome 
is more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”23 
We fear that Professor Imwinkelried has glossed over the serious nature 
of the challenge to SBS/AHT expert opinions by framing the dispute as 
essentially one between pediatricians, armed with a solid body of medical 
research supporting the SBS/AHT hypothesis on the one hand, and a small 
group of biomechanical engineers armed with a few contradictory studies on 
the other.24  Professor Imwinkelried notes, for example, that, “in recent years, 
 
 20  Christian et al., supra note 18, at 1409–10. 
 21  Dias, supra note 18, at 364 (emphasis in original).  To anyone familiar with either the 
literature on wrongful convictions or the social science literature on confessions and 
interrogations, such unquestioning reliance on alleged confessions to substitute for scientific 
research is, to say the least, startling.  See Findley et al., supra note 10; DEBORAH 
TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF 
INJUSTICE (2014).   
 22  Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that “no 
reasonable juror, hearing all of the evidence including that from Del Prete’s experts, could 
find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 23  Id. at 957 n.10. 
 24  In part, this may be because Professor Imwinkelried was misled by some of the 
writings he cites by authors such as Professor Joelle Anne Moreno and former SBS-prosecutor 
Brian Holmgren.  See, e.g., Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 14.  In those writings, Moreno 
and Holmgren take the U.S. Supreme Court (and the SBS-critics the justices relied upon) to 
task for recognizing the controversies in the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” in Cavazos v. Smith, 132 
S. Ct. 2, 10 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In their critique, Moreno and Holmgren 
misleadingly take up one of the SBS proponents’ new strategic ploys—to deny that there is 
any controversy about SBS/AHT, or any weakness in the scientific foundations for the 
hypothesis—despite the widespread recognition of both the controversies and the weaknesses 
of the scientific foundation, discussed above, and elsewhere.  See supra notes 9–21 and 
accompanying text; see also Carol E. Nicholson, Preface to AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
PEDIATRICS, INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA, at IX (Robert M. Reece & Carol E. 
Nicholson eds., 2003) (“The debate of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ continues to rage in our 
country.  Because there is very little scientific experimental or descriptive work, the 
pathophysiology remains obscure, and the relationship to mechanics even cloudier.  The 
situation has not been made better by the constant emotional and forensic advocacy, which 
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biomechanical experts have sharply criticized the hypothesis.  They rely 
primarily on studies with primates and anthropomorphic models.  Those 
studies suggest that without more, mere shaking cannot generate enough 
force to cause fatal injury to the infant brain.”25 
Indeed the biomechanical research does pose an enormous challenge to 
the SBS hypothesis, because the biomechanical research—using well-
accepted research tools and methodologies—consistently shows that violent 
shaking of an infant by a human adult cannot generate accelerations that 
come anywhere close to estimated thresholds for brain injury or death.26  The 
research also consistently shows that, if shaking could generate sufficient 
accelerations, it would necessarily produce massive neck and spine 
injuries—which are not typical in SBS/AHT cases.27  Finally, the 
biomechanical research consistently shows that short-distance falls (such as 
 
seems to escalate every week on every side of this subject area. . . . What we need is science—
research and evidence that just isn’t there right now.  The evidence that does exist has not 
been subjected to evidence-based scrutiny in a multidisciplinary scientific forum.”); Stephen 
Goudge, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO—REPORT 527–28 
(2008) (“[O]ne of the deepest controversies surrounding pediatric forensic pathology 
concerns shaken baby syndrome. . . . [The] evolution in forensic pathology in this area [has 
progressed such that] the predominant view is no longer that the triad on its own is diagnostic 
of SBS.  Instead, the issue is fraught with controversy.”); Sandeep K. Narang et al., 
Acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome and Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177 
J. PEDIATRICS 273, 277 (2016) (reporting that two surveys of pathologists found that thirty-
five percent to nearly sixty percent of forensic pathologists in 2010 and 2015 respectively 
question the SBS “diagnosis”).  In a new book, Randy Papetti meticulously and thoroughly 
debunks the specious claim that there is no legitimate debate about SBS/AHT. RANDY 
PAPETTI, THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME ch. 4 (2017).   
 25  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1111 (footnote omitted).   
 26  See, e.g., Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, 
Pathological and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 (1987); Michael 
Thomas Prange et al., Anthropomorphic Simulation of Falls, Shakes and Inflicted Impacts in 
Infants, 99 J. NEUROSURGERY 143, 147, 149 (2003); John Lloyd et al., Biomechanical 
Evaluation of Head Kinematics During Infant Shaking Versus Pediatric Activities of Daily 
Living, J. FORENSIC BIOMECHANICS 6 (2011).  As Professor Imwinkelried notes, SBS-
hypothesis-proponents challenge the biomechanical research; indeed, they contend that the 
biomechanical research must all be wrong, in part because it relies on estimates of injury 
thresholds for infants that could be wrong.  Estimating injury thresholds for infants is indeed 
a challenge, but that critique would only invalidate the findings of the biomechanical research 
if those estimates—based on extrapolation from known injury thresholds for adults, cadaver 
studies, animal studies, and computer modeling—were off by many orders of magnitude, 
which is highly unlikely.  Moreover, that critique implicitly puts the burden of proof on the 
critics of the SBS hypothesis to prove that infant injury thresholds are not being estimated at 
least approximately correctly based on existing evidence, rather than on SBS-hypothesis-
proponents to prove that the injury threshold is some order of magnitude different, a 
proposition for which there is no biomechanical evidence.   
 27  See, e.g., Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Biomechanics Analysis of Injury 
Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 71, 71 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ee5c
/5d9a5279da7237272ee50a76fa0344a9902e.pdf?_ga=2.255732685.434200710.1526570687
-1838845519.1526570687; Prange et al., supra note 25, at 147; PAPETTI, supra note 24, at 
96–104, and sources cited therein.  
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falls off of furniture) produce many times more accelerations than the most 
vigorous shaking, and that they can produce accelerations that exceed 
estimated injury thresholds28—thereby debunking one of the cardinal 
principles of the SBS dogma, which has consistently maintained that the 
medical findings and injuries used to diagnose SBS/AHT cannot be caused 
by accidental short-distance falls.29 
Moreover, unlike the (perhaps unintended) suggestion of Professor 
Imwinkelried’s analysis, the challenge to the SBS/AHT hypothesis does not 
rest solely on biomechanical engineering studies.  Much of the challenge 
comes from a large and growing body of medical literature questioning the 
hypothesized mechanism and pathophysiology of injury in such cases.30  
Much also rests on a large and growing body of medical research identifying 
a range of natural and accidental causes that can and do generate the findings 
and injuries previously ascribed virtually exclusively to SBS/AHT—the so-
called “mimics” of abuse, which can confound any attempt to “diagnose” 
abuse.31  And much of it rests on a large and growing body of medical and 
 
 28  Patrick E. Lantz & Daniel E. Couture, Fatal Acute Intracranial Injury, Subdural 
Hematoma and Retinal Hemorrhages Caused by Stairway Falls, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1648 
(2011); Nicole G. Ibrahim & Susan S. Margulies, Biomechanics of Toddler Head During 
Low-Height Falls: An Anthropomorphic Dummy Analysis, 6 J. NEUROSURGERY PEDIATRICS 
57 (2010); Chittaranjan Behera, Ravi Rautji & Tirath Das Dogra, Fatal Accidental Fall from 
Height in Infants and Children: A Study from South Delhi, 50 MED., SCI., & L. 224 (2010); 
Michael Thomas Prange, Ann-Christine Duhaime, Brittany Coats & Susan S. Margulies, 
Anthropomorphic Simulation of Falls, Shakes and Inflicted Impacts in Infants, 99 J. 
NEUROSURGERY 143 (2003); Paul Steinbok, Ashutosh Singhal, Ken Poskitt & D. Douglas 
Cochrane, Early Hypodensity on Computed Tomographic Scan of the Brain in an Accidental 
Pediatric Head Injury, 60 NEUROSURGERY 689 (2007); John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head 
Injuries Caused by Short Distance Falls, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1 (2001), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c67e/29d482e7f9bea8f50ff3be3698b770dd4faa.pdf.   
 29  See Findley et al., supra note 10, at 245–49. 
 30  See, e.g., Patrick D. Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury And The Mimics: Issues 
and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based Medicine, 49 RADIOLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 
205 (2011); J.F. Geddes et al., Dural Haemorrhage in Non-Traumatic Infant Deaths: Does It 
Explain the Bleeding in ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’?, 29 NEUROPATHOLOGY & APPLIED 
NEUROBIOLOGY 14, 14 (2003); J.F. Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in 
Children, I. Patterns of Brain Damage, 124 BRAIN 1290 (2001); J.F. Geddes et al., 
Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children, II. Microscopic Brain Injury in Infants, 
124 BRAIN 1299, 1299, 1304 (2001); Waney Squier, The “Shaken Baby” Syndrome: 
Pathology and Mechanisms, 122 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519 (2011); Julie Mack, Waney 
Squier & James Eastman, Anatomy and Development of the Meninges: Implications for 
Subdural Collections and CSF Circulation, 39 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 200, 200 (2009); 
Ronald H. Uscinski, Shaken Baby Syndrome: An Odyssey, 46 NEUROLOGIA MEDICO-
CHIRURGICA (Tokyo) 57 (2006). 
 31  See, e.g., Patrick D. Barnes & Michael Krasnokutsky, Imaging of the Central Nervous 
System in Suspected or Alleged Nonaccidental Injury, Including the Mimics, 18 TOPICS 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 53, 65–70 (2007); Andrew P. Sirotnak, Medical Disorders 
that Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A 
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 191 (Lori Frasier et al., eds., 2006). 
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other scientific research indisputably debunking previously held beliefs 
about various aspects of the SBS/AHT hypothesis, such as old beliefs that 
the shaking had to have been intentional or at least reckless, because it would 
have required force equivalent to throwing a child out of a third-floor 
window or hitting a child with an automobile at 30 miles per hour;32 or old 
beliefs that a child with the telltale brain injuries would have been rendered 
immediately comatose and unresponsive and could not have experienced a 
“lucid interval” between injury and collapse;33 or old beliefs that findings 
like retinal hemorrhages could be caused by nothing except the violent 
rotational forces associated with shaking.34  Finally, as discussed above, the 
challenge rests on the growing recognition that the SBS/AHT hypothesis 
simply lacks a scientific evidence base. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXPERT EVIDENCE IN SBS/AHT CASES 
Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis also, we fear, fails to appreciate 
sufficiently the significance of the scientific or medical opinion evidence in 
SBS/AHT cases, and thereby fails to recognize the corresponding 
importance of new medical and scientific evidence when it emerges to 
challenge the trial expert testimony.  More than almost any other type of case 
(with the possible exception of arson35), SBS/AHT prosecutions often rely 
almost entirely on expert testimony.  The typical case is an unwitnessed 
event in which a child is found in seizure, or comatose and unresponsive.  
(Indeed, remarkably, no documented cases in the literature of which we are 
aware involve videotaped or even reliably witnessed incidents of shaking 
leading to serious brain injury or death; in every such videotaped incident 
involving violent shaking of which we are aware the child has been 
uninjured.)36  Expert testimony is then used to establish every element of the 
crime. 
 
 32  See Keith A. Findley, Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New 
Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 219, 223 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).   
 33  See, e.g., M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in 
Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723, 724 
(1998).  
 34  See, e.g., E. Matshes, Retinal and Optic Nerve Sheath Hemorrhages Are Not 
Pathognomonic of Abusive Head Injury, 16 PROC. OF THE AM. ACAD. FORENS. SCI. 272 
(2010); Findley et al., supra note 10, at 251–54. 
 35  See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENT 184 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
 36  By contrast, there are now numerous reliably witnessed and videotaped incidents in 
which children have suffered short-distance falls (such as off of chairs or beds or low-height 
indoor play structures that resulted in brain injury and death).   
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The experts opine as to the actus reus—violent shaking, or shaking with 
impact, had to have been employed to produce such injuries.  The experts 
likewise opine as to mens rea—the shaking had to have been so violent that 
it could not have been accidental; it had to have been intentional, or at least 
reckless (the typical elements required for child abuse or homicide).  And 
finally, the experts often opine—erroneously—that because the child would 
have become immediately comatose and unresponsive, the last person with 
the child had to be the perpetrator, thereby establishing identity.37  These 
cases are thus what Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has aptly called a 
“medical diagnosis of murder.”38 
In this sense, though, even that terminology is not quite right, for these 
cases do not involve a medical diagnosis in the true sense.  Rather, they 
involve a causation inquiry that goes beyond diagnosis, and ventures into 
etiology—a matter that exceeds the expertise of physicians, and makes the 
medical opinion evidence simultaneously much more important and less 
reliable than expert evidence in other kinds of cases. 
As used in medicine, diagnosis refers to the process of determining the 
disease or dysfunctional condition from which a patient suffers in order to 
determine the best course of treatment to cure or relieve the disease or 
condition.  The disease or condition is inferred from signs, symptoms, risk 
factors, and the results of diagnostic tests.  Signs are objective conditions or 
manifestations observed by the physician either directly or with the aid of 
sense-enhancing instruments such as a stethoscope.  Symptoms are 
subjective reports of pain, weakness, or other conditions associated with the 
complaint of the patient in regard to a dysfunctional condition or disease.  
Risk factors (beyond those represented directly by signs or symptoms) are 
such things as family history of disease, exposure to disease-causing agents, 
etc., which are usually derived from the patient’s history as recounted by the 
patient (or next of kin), or derived from the patient’s previous medical 
records.  Finally, diagnostic tests, which are often the result of chemical 
analysis of bodily fluids or tissues, give results correlated by previous 
research with certain diseases or conditions.  They are usually performed by 
someone other than the treating physician and are often now instrumented to 
a greater or lesser degree. 
One thing to note at the outset is that diagnosis is not directly concerned 
with the cause of a disease or condition, although some diagnoses will entail 
causes established by previous research, and some diagnostic tests will 
reveal the presence of a causal agent associated with the condition by 
 
 37  DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME” AND 
THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE 5 (2014).   
 38  Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the 
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009). 
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previous research.  The point is that diagnostic judgment itself does not 
address causation independent of previous research on the cause of a disease 
or constellation of sign and symptoms. 
This is true also of the iterative process known as differential diagnosis.  
Differential diagnosis refers to the process whereby the physician ideally 
determines all the diseases or conditions that might account for a set of signs 
and symptoms, rank orders them by probability (or sometimes severity), and 
proceeds to attempt to rule out the members of the list by further tests.  In 
practice, whether one actually rules out of every possibility except one will 
depend on the remoteness of initial probabilities and the availability and 
expense of diagnostic tests, and often the most life-threatening or the most 
probable disease after convenient diagnostic testing has been done will be 
treated first, and only when treatment fails will that disease be eliminated 
and either further more rigorous or costly testing, or treatment for the next 
most likely disease, be undertaken.  Note that differential diagnosis involves 
a feedback loop where initial diagnostic hypotheses are modified in light of 
newly acquired information.  And most importantly, skill in differential 
diagnosis (or diagnosis generally) does not provide one with special skill in 
determining causation in regard to the disease or condition finally settled on 
and treated successfully.  The skill is in determining the disease or condition 
in the patient, and knowing how to treat it successfully, not in determining 
its cause.39  Determining cause (the “etiology” of a disease) is a specialty of 
scientific medical research, not of practical diagnosis by practicing 
physicians.  Of course, practicing physicians may be willing to opine on 
causation of conditions like various cancers, and they may invoke their 
diagnostic skills in the process, but this is misplaced.  Determining the 
etiology of a disease that has not yet been established by formal research 
(even through a process that might resemble “differential diagnosis” 
 
 39  Here we must be clear on the sense in which we are using the term “cause.”  It is not 
uncommon to say that when a particular disease has been identified as the source of a person’s 
signs and symptoms, the diagnosis has identified the “cause” of those signs and symptoms.  
In an extended sense this is not incorrect, but not in the sense covered by the concept of 
etiology, which deals with the question of what causes the disease itself.  Malaria provides a 
helpful example.  For centuries malaria was easily diagnosed in typical cases involving 
malarial paroxysm—shaking chills alternating with high fever and sweats over a two- or 
three-day cycle.  However, the cause, in any useful sense, was unknown (the very name 
indicates the cause was assigned to “bad air.”)  Identifying the cause of malaria in detail is a 
triumph of modern medical research, beginning in 1880 with Laveran’s observation of 
parasites in the blood of infected individuals, and continuing in the subsequent decades as the 
different species of Plasmodium responsible for the variations of the disease, and the role of 
mosquitos in spreading the infection was worked out in detail.  See the history section of the 
Wikipedia article on malaria, Malaria, WIKIPEDIA (May 5, 2018), https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Malaria.  So a physician in 1875 could diagnose the disease, and even treat some cases 
fairly well with quinine, but had no well-warranted idea of the cause of the disease itself—its 
etiology.   
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superficially) is beyond the scope of the practitioner’s training an expertise, 
and represents no more than a conjectural hypothesis at best.  There is no 
training, formal or otherwise, in “differential etiology” in medical school. 
Indeed, in civil cases, courts have recognized the important distinction 
between differential etiology and differential diagnosis, and that the former 
is a much more dubious proposition.  As one civil court put it bluntly, “The 
differential diagnosis method has an inherent reliability; the differential 
etiology method does not.”40  Part of this is because doctors receive training 
in diagnosis, but not etiology.  But part of it is also because etiological 
questions offer no opportunity for learning from experience.  As there is no 
treatment for shaking (or other abuse), there simply is no mechanism for 
learning about or informing a physician about whether a diagnosis” of abuse 
was correct or incorrect;41 without such feedback, there is no opportunity to 
learn.42 
Moreover, as one of us has observed previously: 
 
As problematic as the causation determination can be in tort cases, 
that determination, employing a differential etiology 
methodology, is even more challenging in SBS/AHT cases. The 
reason is simple. In the typical tort case the question posed to the 
expert is whether a known historical fact connects causally to a 
known injury or outcome. But in SBS/AHT cases, the historical 
fact at issue—whether the accused violently shook or shook and 
slammed the child—is itself unproven and unknown. In the SBS/
AHT context, the expert is asked not just to relate cause to effect 
 
 40  Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d, 300 
F. App’x 700 (11th Cir. 2008). See also TUERKHEIMER, supra note 20, at 76; Findley, supra 
note 35.   
 41  One of us has explained this previously in this way: “Experience can be a valuable 
part of any expert’s expertise, if it is the sort of experience from which the expert can learn. 
The true differential diagnosis—diagnosing a patient’s medical illness or condition for 
purposes of prescribing treatment—at least has the potential for enabling the doctor to learn 
from experience, and hence for improving reliability.  If the doctor misdiagnoses an illness or 
condition, the treatment will likely fail, and the doctor will adjust the diagnosis and the 
treatment accordingly.  But because there is no treatment for abuse, judgments about causation 
(etiology) do not offer similar opportunities for feedback and learning, and hence for ensuring 
experience-based reliability. Asking doctors to draw legal conclusions, like causation, 
imposes demands on science that it is ill-suited to meet.”  Findley, supra note 35, at 191–92.  
 42  See, e.g., Gordon D. Schiff, Minimizing Diagnostic Error: The Importance of Follow-
up and Feedback, 121 AM. J. MED. S38, S38 (2008) (“An open-loop system (also called a 
‘nonfeedback controlled’ system) is one that makes decisions based solely on preprogrammed 
criteria and the preexisting model of the system.  This approach does not use feedback to 
calibrate its output or determine if the desired goal is achieved. . . . [Such a system] cannot 
engage in learning.”); Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of 
Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S10 (2008) (discussing the problems with 
absent or delayed feedback in medical diagnosis).  
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when both the alleged cause and effect have been observed, but to 
relate cause to effect when only the effect has been observed; it 
asks the expert to divine not only the relationship between the 
precipitating event and the outcome, but to divine even the 
existence of the alleged precipitating event itself, which has not 
been observed or otherwise proven.43 
 
Given all this, it is important to keep in mind that expert testimony in 
SBS/AHT cases is not just routine expert evidence.  It is often the whole 
case, or the primary evidence of guilt.  And yet it is highly tenuous.  Thus, 
we believe shifts in the scientific and medical understandings underlying the 
SBS/AHT hypothesis necessarily take on greater significance than Professor 
Imwinkelried recognizes. 
IV. THE VARIED LEGAL ISSUES THAT CAN ARISE RELATED TO THE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SBS AND LIKE CASES 
Professor Imwinkelried illustrates his point by referring to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Gimenez v. Ochoa,44 and in particular by contrasting it 
to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Edmunds.45  Again, 
we fear, Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis paints too broadly, and masks 
important distinctions between the cases, and the very limited nature of the 
holding in Gimenez.  Before explaining why, however, it is worth noting that 
the shifting science related to SBS/AHT—as with any developing scientific 
matter—can pose a variety of legal issues in the post-conviction context, 
which require varied analyses.  One issue inevitably relates to admissibility 
of expert opinions, whether the jurisdiction follows Daubert46 or Frye,47 or 
some other admissibility standard.  We take it that Professor Imwinkelried’s 
analysis in this symposium is not addressed to admissibility of either the 
prosecution or defense experts in such cases—a matter that Professor 
Imwinkelried has addressed in detail in prior writing.48  Other claims arising 
 
 43  Findley, supra note 35, at 192 (footnote omitted).   
 44  Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 503 (2016).   
 45  State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).   
 46  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
 47  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 48  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific 
(and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2010) (arguing that “given the current 
state of the empirical data, there is a genuine battle of the experts . . . [and that, therefore,] 
both sides should be permitted to present their theories to the trier of fact”). Even on that issue, 
however, it is worth noting that, while in global terms, Professor Imwinkelried is correct that 
expert testimony on both sides is likely admissible, in particular aspects or applications, some 
claims that have been made by experts in the past are clearly now scientifically wrong, and 
hence can no longer be admissible.  These include claims that physicians at one time regularly 
made for example, that nothing can cause the triad of findings except violent shaking; or that 
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from evolving science relate to the standards for granting a new trial based 
on shifted science.  But even within that category, the issues can be varied 
and nuanced.  In some cases, for example, the question might be whether the 
science has shifted sufficiently to reveal that the prosecution relied upon 
false evidence at trial.  In others, it might be whether shifts or emerging 
debates are adequate to satisfy a jurisdiction’s standards for granting a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence.  In others, the question will be 
whether new scientific evidence is sufficient to establish innocence to a 
degree sufficient to permit a federal court in habeas review to permit a 
procedurally defaulted claim to proceed under Schlup v. Delo,49 or to permit 
a federal habeas court consider a successive petition.  In still others, the 
question will be whether the shifted science is enough to meet whatever 
freestanding claim of actual innocence there might be under the Due Process 
Clause after Herrera v. Collins.50  It is in this regard that we fear Professor 
Imwinkelrieid’s analysis obscures these distinctions, and thus fails to 
recognize the many instances in which the kinds of evidence presented in 
Gimenez might indeed warrant granting post-conviction relief. 
Gimenez addressed just two (or three) of the issues outlined above—
and they were ones under which the petitioner was required to meet the most 
onerous of all of the various legal standards that govern these various claims, 
made even more onerous because the claim was raised in a federal habeas 
challenge to a state court conviction under the very tight restrictions imposed 
by Congress in that context.  The first claim was that Due Process was 
violated because the prosecution’s expert witnesses presented false 
testimony at trial.51  It was only in that context that the court ruled that 
shifting medical opinions and emerging controversies are not enough, 
because disagreements, even profound ones, do not prove prior testimony to 
be false.  The court explained: “To the extent that this new testimony 
contradicts the prosecution’s expert testimony, it’s simply a difference in 
opinions—not false testimony.”52 
The second, and related, third claim similarly alleged that the trial 
testimony was false, but somewhat differently claimed that the new evidence 
 
short falls cannot kill; or that a child cannot suffer a lucid interval after suffering a fatal brain 
injury.  For a discussion of these limitations, see Findley et al., supra note 10, at 245–51, 302–
06.  Further, it is worth noting that, when criminal responsibility is at stake, simply throwing 
such disputes to juries to resolve, most likely inconsistently from case to case, is not 
necessarily a good practice comporting with substantial justice, but that problem is probably 
better handled through principles of sufficiency of evidence rather than by reference to 
admissibility.  
 49  513 U.S. 298 (1995).   
 50  506 U.S. 390 (1993).   
 51  Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 52  Id.   
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proved Gimenez’s actual innocence such that he was entitled both to seek 
relief in a “successive” habeas petition and substantively entitled to relief.  
But again, the standard was too onerous to meet in the face of disagreement 
among experts.  As the court put it, “Gimenez can’t prove by ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ that ‘no reasonable factfinder’ would have found him 
guilty but for the introduction of purportedly flawed SBS testimony.”53 
As this brief analysis of the issues demonstrates, Gimenez does not at 
all address admissibility of any of the expert evidence, or more importantly, 
whether a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence 
(based on new SBS/AHT research) or ineffective assistance of counsel 
(based on counsel’s failure to present existing research)—these latter claims 
being the ones that most frequently arise in post-conviction SBS litigation.  
It was precisely such a claim that the Wisconsin court addressed in State v. 
Edmunds.54  There, the court concluded that, where the case depended 
entirely on expert opinions; and where the jury at trial had been told that 
nothing could have caused the triad of findings but shaking or shaking with 
impact, that the child could not have experienced a “lucid interval,” and that 
the medical science on these points was settled and indisputable; then under 
those circumstances the emergence of contrary science after trial was indeed 
enough to constitute newly discovered evidence and require a new trial, at 
which the jury could consider the competing expert opinions.  The Edmunds 
Court explained: “[T]here has been a shift in mainstream medical opinion 
since the time of Edmunds’s trial as to the cause of the types of injuries 
Natalie suffered. . . .  However, it is the emergence of a legitimate and 
significant dispute within the medical community as to the cause of those 
injuries that constitutes newly discovered evidence.”55  Unlike in Gimenez, 
the defendant’s burden was not to prove that the testimony from trial was 
indisputably false, but rather to show that new science constituted new 
evidence that created at least a reasonable probability that a jury would find 
reasonable doubt and acquit.56 
 
 53  Id. at 1145.   
 54  In the interest of full disclosure, we note that one of us, Findley, was counsel for 
Audrey Edmunds in that litigation. 
 55  State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).   
 56  This is the substantive standard of harmfulness to be applied to evidence not before 
the jury as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, applicable to all jurisdictions under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  If the new evidence comes from advances in 
science since the trial, however, there is no currently no clear constitutionally necessary 
uniformity in the standard to be applied from state to state, since the original trial was free of 
constitutional error when it took place.  Nevertheless, many states do apply a test analogous 
to the Strickland test of harm to determine the propriety of granting a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence.  See the cases collected in footnote 57 below.  In addition, we believe 
that this standard is the morally correct standard for evaluating the propriety of giving a new 
trial in all cases of “fresh evidence,” as the British call it, wherever it falls into the artificial 
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Unfortunately, that is a scenario that Professor Imwinkelried does not 
address at all, despite his reference to Edmunds.  Yet that is the context in 
which courts are now most frequently granting post-conviction relief in 
SBS/AHT cases.57  Worse, by juxtaposing Gimenez against Edmunds, 
 
dichotomy between evidence that was not before the jury because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel or because it is considered “newly discovered.” Professor Imwinkelried’s “general 
standard” asks different questions concerning the evaluation of new science-based 
knowledge.  In order to obtain relief, he says “(1) the accused presents testimony about a new 
analytic technique developed in subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a 
different outcome than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3) the validation of 
the new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the prior expert testimony or 
seriously undermines confidence in its correctness.”  Imwinkelried, supra note 1, text at 19 
n.83.  First, on a purely technical level, it should not matter if the “analytic technique” 
deployed is new, as long as the results are new and could not have been obtained by a 
reasonably diligent defense attorney for trial.  The undermining of comparative bullet lead 
analysis did not result from new techniques, but from known research techniques newly 
deployed.  Second, the general standard does not directly ask a question about the probable 
effect of the new information on a jury.  While Professor Imwinkelried’s general standard 
might be interpreted in this way, it might not, and we believe that the effect on a jury of the 
new information in the context of the whole case is the pole star for determining the propriety 
of a new trial grant in every case.   
 57  For examples of other cases in which courts have ordered new trials in SBS/AHT 
cases based on the shifting science, either because the science is newly discovered, or because 
counsel was ineffective for failing to use it at trial, or because the defense was otherwise 
denied resources needed to challenge the medical evidence, see People v. Roberts, 892 
N.W.2d 353 (Mich. 2017) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 
N.E.3d 808 (Mass. 2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 
N.E.3d 1247 (Mass. 2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence); 
Isham v. State, 161 So.3d 1076 (Miss. 2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. 
Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858 (Mich. 2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Brown v. State, 
152 So.3d 1146 (Miss. 2014) (new trial granted because trial court erroneously denied funds 
for defense to hire experts to challenge State’s expert medical evidence); People v. Baumer, 
781 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. 2010) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Schoonmaker, 176 
P.3d 1105 (N.M. 2008) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 
2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1996) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. DiMambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel); In re Pers. Restraint of Fero, 367 P.3d 588 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2016) (newly discovered evidence); Ex Parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2012) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Hansen, 805 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Ware, 679 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Bartok, 953 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Ex 
Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ineffective assistance of counsel); 
People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 728 (Cty. Ct., Monroe Cty. 2014) (newly discovered 
evidence); State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-0CR00016-02 (Cir. Ct. Shelby Cty., Mo., Nov. 2007) 
(newly discovered evidence); Illinois v. Rieken, No. 05C-CFJ75 (Cir. Ct. Iroquois Cty., Ill., 
Mar. 2009) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Witt, No. 2-CA-CR2011-0320, 2012 WL 
5991566 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (newly discovered evidence); Alexandra Gross, John 
Peel, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/e
xoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3813 (newly discovered evidence); Maurice 
Possley, Joel Lehmer, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (July 29, 2012), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3953 (newly 
discovered evidence); Joseph Shapiro, Free, But Not Cleared: Ernie Lopez Comes Home, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/03/05/147969316/free-but-not-
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Professor Imwinkelried creates the impression that they two cases reach 
contradictory results, and that Gimenez is the more principled.  But the reality 
is, they are not inconsistent; they just address different legal claims that 
require different analyses (and in some cases, different outcomes).  Edmunds 
and the growing body of like cases are analytically and factually sound, 
regardless of the limitations of federal habeas law in addressing narrow 
claims like those addressed in Gimenez. 
V. THE ULTIMATE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEWLY RECOGNIZED 
CONTROVERSIES IN THE MEDICO-LEGAL HYPOTHESES 
UNDERLYING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SUCH CASES 
What’s missing from Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis is recognition 
that the case he posits—expert trial testimony based on a solid foundation at 
trial that is then challenged post-conviction by a single new study that 
contradicts the trial experts, raised in a narrow context (like federal habeas) 
where the convicted person’s burden is to prove that the trial testimony was 
demonstrably false, or the individual is demonstrably innocent—is so narrow 
and extreme as to be almost meaningless.  In the real-world context of SBS/
AHT litigation, the much more frequent scenario is one in which expert 
testimony constituted almost the entirety of the proof at trial, the scientific 
foundation for that testimony was never (and still is not) there, the research 
undermining the SBS/AHT testimony either did not yet exist or was 
erroneously overlooked, and so the jury never had the opportunity to 
consider the real legal and scientific issues in the case.  In those 
circumstances, neither law nor logic requires what Gimenez requires—proof 
that the science at trial has been indisputably shown to be false.  Rather, 
Edmunds and the growing number of like cases that have followed58 strike 
that balance, establishing that new challenges to the medical opinions at trial 
often are enough to warrant a new trial when the science is this central to the 
case, and the challenge is so serious that a jury ought in fairness to hear it 
because there is a reasonable probability of an acquittal given the new 
evidence. 
 
cleared-ernie-lopez-comes-home (ineffective assistance of counsel); Barry Siegel, Judging 
Parents as Murderers on 4 Specks of Blood, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 1999), http://articles.lat
imes.com/1999/jul/11/news/mn-54984 (newly discovered evidence); Kenneth Marsh, CAL. 
INNOCENCE PROJECT (2018), https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/kenn
eth-marsh/ (newly discovered evidence); Armando Castillo Vacated After 13 Years, ARIZ. 
JUST. PROJECT (May 21, 2015), https://www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injustice-
profiles/armando-castillo (ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence).  
Still other courts have also granted relief under the more difficult standards requiring a 
petitioner to establish actual innocence.  See, e.g., Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907 
(N.D. Ill. 2014); Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 WL 5801204 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016).  
 58  See id.   
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And this is no longer just a judicial response to this problem.  In 
jurisdictions where state law provided no avenue for relief in such cases, 
legislatures are beginning to respond by creating statutes designed to permit, 
even require, new trials when new evidence emerges to challenge the science 
relied upon at trial.  Texas was the first of these states,59 followed thereafter 
by California.60  In both states, the statutes now provide a remedy when 
scientific evidence presented at trial has been undermined by subsequent 
research.  It is a response that only makes sense.  While the tensions between 
law and science have been widely recognized in many contexts, it is in cases 
like this—where weak science constitutes the entirety of the case—that the 
law must most readily accommodate shifts and challenges to that science. 
 
 
 59  Texas State Bill 344 authorizes courts to grant relief in state habeas corpus petitions 
where the petitioner shows that relevant scientific evidence that is currently available but was 
not available at the time of trial if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
person would not have been convicted had the new evidence been presented at trial.  See S.B. 
344, 85th Leg., (Tex. 2017), https://openstates.org/tx/bills/85/SB344. 
 60  California Penal Code section 1473, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(3), provide a right to 
a new trial under either of two circumstances: (1) if the expert repudiates his or her own 
opinion given at trial; or (2) if the opinion given at trial is undermined by subsequent 
“scientific research or technological advances.” CAL. PENAL CODE §1473(b)(1), (b)(3) (West 
2017). 
